The Marathas And Their Policy Of Expansion

The Maratha movement was a complicated one, combining an earlier movement for socio-religious reform with the Maratha sardars' movement for regional independence. The political, socio-religious, and economic aspects of the movement all had their own set of contradictions, which were ultimately rooted in the interests of different social groups. 

 

•    The Maratha sardars, who dominated Maratha society, were uninterested in socio-religious reform or ensuring the welfare of the peasantry unless it served their own interests. The peasantry was neglected after Shivaji's death, and the links between the political and socio-religious reform movements were weakened. 

 

•    The Mughal assault shattered Shivaji's state structure, allowing various Maratha sardars to engage in guerilla warfare, often on their own behalf. According to recent research, these sardars were not typically drawn from Maharashtra's powerful deshmukhi families, but rather were men of humble origin who rose to prominence based on their own abilities in the expanded type of warfare and their ability to attract a following. The hierarchical kin-based society of Rajasthan, as well as a hierarchical set up under the Mughals, contrasted sharply with the openness of Maratha society.

 

•    Following Aurangzeb's death in 1707, it was unlikely that these powerful sardars would submit to Shahu after his return from Mughal captivity. The Maratha sardars, in fact, played a game between Shahu and his rival, Tara Bai, in order to maintain their power and status. Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath, who made a complicated revenue division between Shahu and his sardars in 1719, put a stamp on the process. In general, his system implied that the collection of chauth and sardeshmukhi was entirely the responsibility of the Maratha sardars. A fixed share of these collections was to be paid to the Raja - sardeshmukhi plus 34% of the chauth. As a result, the Raja's finances were heavily reliant on his sardars. The responsibility for collecting chauth and sardeshmukhi was also divided in such a way that no single Maratha Sardar could easily dominate a large, compact area. A centralised system of administration under the care and supervision of the Peshwa slowly grew up inside the areas directly controlled by the Peshwa.

 

•    Balaji Vishwanath's arrangements have been widely criticised, and their flaws are obvious enough. While the Maratha sardars were given an added incentive for plundering and overrunning Mughal territory, they were also given almost complete autonomy from the King. 

 

•    The Peshwaship, which became a major factor in Maratha politics from this time on, became a focal point for the hope of effective political unity among the Marathas.

 

•    Baji Rao was the true founder of the hereditary Peshwa institution. In 1720, Shahu appointed Baji Rao to his father's vacant office in recognition of the latter's signal services. Although the incumbents of the various leading posts at Shahu's darbar already regarded them as their hereditary preserves, there is no clear evidence that Shahu regarded the post as hereditary in the family of Balaji Vishwanath at this time.

 

•    Baji Rao established the issue beyond a shadow of a doubt through his military victories and by steadily transferring authority to his office until it became the focal point of the Maratha political system.

 

•    With Baji Rao's accession to the Peshwaship, the Maratha movement shifted from defensive to offensive, from a struggle for national survival to empire building. This transformation did not occur overnight. During the last years of Aurangzeb's reign, the Marathas began raiding Gujarat and Malwa on a regular basis, signalling a shift in the nature of the conflict. But it wasn't until Baji Rao arrived on the scene that the new trend became a firm policy. The adoption of the new policy was preceded by a long legal battle between Baji Rao and the Pratinidhi Shripat Rao in the Maratha court. 

 

•    A rough idea of the approach and general line of argument adopted by the two men can be formed from Chitnis' near-contemporary account, though it would be dangerous to take the purple passages and long speeches put into the mouths of the protagonists literally.

 

1.    Maratha expansionist activities' direction and timing

2.    Nizam-ul-attitude Mulk's and the possibility of maintaining cordial relations with his

3.    Internal administration, particularly the problem of controlling the Maratha sardars and restoring order to the finances, army, and other institutions. 

 

Finally, there was the issue of power: who would rule the King's councils, the Peshwa or the Pratinidhi? The Pratinidhi was not opposed to expansionist policies in general, but he preferred that priority be given to the over-running of the Konkan, where the Sidi of Janjira had reclaimed many territories, and the completion of Shivaji's conquest of Karnataka. After consolidating Maratha positions in the Deccan, they might consider expanding their conquest to northern India. The Pratinidhi emphasised the importance of exercising caution and not provoking the Mughals too much, lest they invade the Maratha homeland again. Above all, he wanted to befriend Nizam-ul-Mulk, the powerful ruler. As a result, he desired that large-scale expansionist activities be postponed until the finances had been stabilised and a strong army and stable administrative system had been established.

 

•    Baji Rao, on the other hand, focused on the Mughal Court's weakness and incompetence, which was torn apart by factions and internecine feuds to the point where Maratha assistance was sought, and kings were made and unmade through its means. 

 

•    He dismissed the conquest of Karnataka as a domestic matter best handled by Hazarat (household) troops. He dwelt on the (alleged) friendship of the Hindu powers to the Marathas, and discounted the power of the Nizam, offering to keep him in check as well as to effect a northward drive, alluding to Shivaji's dream of Hindu dominance. 

 

•    Finally, he appealed to the Maratha sardars' predatory instincts by pointing to the riches of northern India, the Deccan having been devastated by long-term warfare. “Strike, strike at the trunk, and the branches will fall of their own accord,” he is said to have said at the end. But heed my advice, and I will raise the Maratha banner on the walls of Attack.” 

 

•    It does not appear to be accurate to assume that Baji Rao's policy of northward expansion meant he was uninterested in the south. Baji Rao demanded the cession of the subah of Hyderabad and the virtual right to nominate the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan as early as 1724, when the Emperor asked for Maratha assistance against Nizam-ul-Mulk.

 

•    As a result, Baji Rao was also interested in Maratha dominance over the Deccan. But he did not share the Pratinidhi's naive optimism that the Marathas could conquer Karnataka without the Nizam's vehement opposition, or that they could conquer the Deccan with only Maharashtra's resources in the face of a cunning and determined foe like Nizam-ul-Mulk. 

 

•    As a result, he was adamant about conquering and bringing the rich and prosperous provinces of Malwa and Gujarat under Maratha control. Since the early nineteenth century, Maratha sardars had raided these provinces and demanded regular contributions. 

 

•    These sporadic raids were given a systematic form and political content by Baji Rao, who recognised the political and strategic importance of these provinces. With the Marathas firmly established in Malwa and Gujarat, a wedge between the Nizam and Delhi would be formed. 

 

•    The Marathas would then encircle the Nizam's territories on three sides, allowing them to turn against him without fear of receiving help from Delhi, or raid the doab and the areas to the east and west of it at their leisure.

 

•    As a result, establishing Maratha dominance in Malwa and Gujarat was the first step toward establishing a large and powerful Maratha empire. 

 

•    It appears historically incorrect to believe that Baji Rao set himself any additional goals. His remark about the Maratha flag being planted on the Attack was nothing more than political hyperbole. For a long time, the task was clearly beyond Maratha strength, and Baji Rao was far too practical a statesman to set himself such impossible goals.