The Saiyid ‘new’ Wizarat

The Saiyids installed a new monarch, the 20-year-old Rafi-ud-Darjat, after deposing Farrukh Siyar. He was, however, consumptive and died four months later. His brother, Rafi-ud-Daulah, succeeded him and died three months later from the same disease. This demonstrated the Saiyids' inability to persuade the majority of royal princes to accept their offer of kingship. 

 

•    During the seven months that these two princes ruled, the Saiyids reserved all positions, such as Daroghas of the Diwan-i-Khas or the Ghusalkhana, or Superintendent of the Haram, for their nominees. The Saiyids hand-picked even the eunuchs and personal attendants of the rulers. 

 

•    The Emperor's guardian was named Saiyid Himmat Khan Baraha, and it was said that without his orders, the Emperor could not even be served food! As a result, the Emperor lost all personal freedom. 

 

•    The hereditary doorkeepers and attendants were allowed to return to their previous positions following the accession of Muhammad Shah, Bahadur Shah's grandson. However, the Emperor remained powerless in all matters of state.

 

•    The Saiyids made as few changes as possible, with the exception of the posts that provided access to the Emperor. As a result, most of the previous governors and officeholders were retained in the provinces. 

 

•    Except for a few of Farrukh Siyar's shady favourites like Muhammad Murad Kashmiri and a few others, most of the others, including Khan-i-Dauran and Mir Jumla, were not stripped of their mansabs and jagirs and given jobs at the court. In general, the Saiyids made no attempt to monopolise state power.

 

•    M. Amin Khan was retained as second bakhshi; another Turani, Roshanuddaulah Zafar Khan, was promoted to third bakhshi; and Inayatullah Khan, whose proposed reforms had enraged Abdullah Khan, was retained as Khan-i-Saman and absentee governor of Kashmir. 

 

•    The governorships of Agra and Allahabad, as well as the faujdari of Moradabad, were the only new posts given to the Barahas, or dependents of the Saiyids, apart from the posts of wazir, Mir Bakhshi, and Viceroyalty of the Deccan, which the Saiyids considered theirs by right.

 

•    Despite their conciliatory policies, the Saiyids were met with resistance in Agra and Allahabad. An adventurer named Mitr Sen and some of his companions proclaimed a rebel prince, Neku Siyar, Emperor in Agra. 

 

•    Chhabela Ram, a Farrukh Siyar protege, led the Allahabad uprising. The Saiyids feared that Neku Siyar would serve as a rallying point for all of their enemies. There were rumours that Nizam-ul-Mulk, the newly appointed governor of Malwa, Chhabela Ram, and Jai Singh would come to Neku Siyar's aid. He did not, however, receive any support from the old nobles, and the Saiyids were able to quickly put down his rebellion. The uprising in Allahabad lasted a little longer. 

 

•    Following Husain Ali's personal intervention, Chhabela Ram's nephew, Girdhar Bahadur, agreed to vacate the fort in exchange for the governorship of Awadh, all the jagirs, including some of the important faujdaris, and rupees thirty lakhs in cash. 

 

•    These terms, as well as the fact that dealing with these two rebellions took fourteen months, demonstrated the Saiyids' power and support: their subordinates lacked experience and power, and the Saiyids themselves were hesitant to leave the capital.

 

•    The Saiyids maintained their previous policy of consolidating their alliance with the Rajputs and Marathas, as well as appeasing Hindu opinion to the greatest extent possible. Jizyah was abolished again shortly after FarrukhSiyar's deposition, with Ajit Singh taking credit for it.

 

•    As a final act of goodwill, Ajit Singh's daughter, who had converted to Islam before marrying Farrukh Siyar, was allowed to renounce her new faith and return to her home, taking with her all of her wealth and property. The Saiyids disregarded the qazis' objections to this step, claiming that renunciation of Islam was illegal.

 

•    The Saiyids also attempted to defeat Jai Singh and Maharana Sangram Singh II through Ajit Singh. Jai Singh had moved to Toda Bhim, 80 kilometres from Agra, with the help and support of the Rana and a number of disgruntled nobles who had fled to Amber. 

 

•    Jai Singh withdrew from Toda Bhim after the fall of Agra and the threat of an invasion of his territory. To appease Jai Singh, he was given the important faujdari of Surat in Gujarat, as well as a substantial sum of money. Along with Gujarat, Ajit Singh was given the subah of Ajmer. 

 

•    The two Rajput rajas, with the Rana of Mewar's support, formed a powerful alliance that could have played a decisive role. The Hindus' regaining confidence is reflected in Khafi Khan's "complaint" that "the infidels were engaged in repairing temples and attempting to forbid cow-slaughter from the environs of the capital to the banks of the Narabada."

 

•    The formal Imperial grant of chauth and sardeshmukhi of the Deccan to Balaji Vishwanath, along with some members of Shahu's family who had been in captivity, strengthened the pact with the Marathas. Despite the fact that no Maratha troops remained in the north, Alam Ali, Husain Ali's deputy in the Deccan, was told to follow Shankarji Malhar's advice in all matters because the latter had close ties to Shahu.

 

•    Churaman Jat was also appeased by being given command of the royal highway connecting Delhi and Gwalior, as well as other concessions. Churaman sided with the Saiyids in the siege of Agra in exchange.

 

•    The Saiyids might have been able to consolidate their position given time and if differences about power, policies, and pelf had not arisen between the two brothers, despite the sullenness of a large section of the nobles and the Turanis' underhanded opposition.

 

•    As a result, disagreements arose between the brothers over the spoils from the fort at Delhi, which had been seized by Abdullah Khan after the deposition of Farrukh Siyar, and the bulk of the treasures at Agra, estimated to be worth two to three crores, which had been seized by Husain Ali after the fall of Neku Siyar. 

 

•    Ratan Chand was able to reach an agreement by pointing to the "Turani" threat, but neither side was satisfied. Between the brothers, there was also a subtle power struggle. Husain Ali was a lot more energetic than Abdullah Khan, and he quickly outclassed him when it came to wielding real power. 

 

•    Husain Ali, on the other hand, had a hot and hasty temperament and failed to carefully consider the situation before making a decision. “He (Husain Ali) regarded himself superior to his brother in military and government matters, though he was forgetful of the real matter, and unacquainted with stratagem,” writes Khafi Khan.

 

•    Abdullah Khan had paid special attention to the old nobles, particularly Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Chin group, because he was aware of their importance. “We are three brothers, Niazm-ul- Mulk is the oldest, Husain Ali is the youngest,” he used to say. Abdullah Khan explained his policy to Nizam-ul-Mulk in the following words:

 

•    “The high and mighty task of administering Hindustan is not one that can be accomplished singlehand¬ed, without the help of prominent nobles and officers of state. Under the circumstances, is it better that I should bring forward new (untried) men and become dependent on them, or that I should continue to take the help of one like you who has ever been a friend?” 

 

•    However, Abdullah Khan wanted to appoint Nizam-ul-Mulk as governor of Bihar, which had notoriously turbulent zamindars and yielded little money, in order to prevent Nizam-ul-Mulk from becoming too powerful. However, Husain Ali insisted on sending Nizam-ul-Mulk to Malwa, confident in the position of his deputy, S.Alam Ali, in the Deccan and his own position in the North.

 

•    Nizam agreed on the condition that it would not be taken away from him anytime soon. Despite the Saiyid's repeated requests, he refused to leave his son as his wakil at the court. More than a thousand mansabdars accompanied him to Malwa, and they brought their families with them.

 

•    As a result, a confrontation between the ‘Chin' group, led by Nizam-uI-Mulk, and the Saiyids seemed unavoidable. Husain Ali exacerbated the situation by transferring Nizam from Malwa and offering him the choice of Agra, Allahabad, Burhanpur, or Multan. Nizamul-Mulk had been gathering men and materials of war in excess of his requirements as governor, and he had his sights set on the Deccan, according to the Saiyids. 

 

•    The depredations of the Marathas, who were harrying the province with 50,000 horses, were used to justify Nizam's actions. Husain Ali was dissatisfied, so he ordered his Bakhshi, S. Dilawar Ali, to keep an eye on the Malwa border. S. Dilawar Ali had been delegated with a large force to deal with a dispute in Kotah-Bundi. After issuing orders for Nizam's transfer from Malwa, Dilawar Ali was warned to be vigilant, and S. Alam Ali was warned to be vigilant in the Deccan. The Saiyids dispatched a mace-bearer to accompany Nizam-ul-Mulk to the court, having taken these precautions.

 

•    There's no doubt that the Saiyids exaggerated their power when they threw the gauntlet down to Nizam-ul-Mulk. M. Amin, his cousin, had warned him that the Saiyids intended to move against him after Girdhar Bahadur's rebellion at Allahabad was over. He'd also received messages from the Emperor and the Queen Mother pleading with him to free them from the Saiyids' grip. 

 

•    As a result, Nizam-ul-Mulk was completely prepared. He ignored the summons to the Court and crossed the Narmada into the Deccan, where he was joined by the governors of Khandesh and Berar almost immediately.

 

•    Many other nobles, including many close to the Saiyids, joined Nizam-ul-Mulk, who zealously preached that whatever he was doing was for the royal house's prestige, the Saiyids having decided to subvert the Timurid dynasty; that the Saiyids were determined to ruin and disgrace all Irani and Turani families beginning with his destruction; and that the Saiyids were determined to ruin and

 

•    Nizam-ul-slogans Mulk's of defence of the king, race, religion, and empire were difficult to counter for the Saiyids. Abdullah Khan's last-ditch efforts to appease Nizam by granting him the Viceroyalty of the Deccan failed miserably and were rejected by Husain Ali. 

 

•    The Saiyids' decision to divide their forces was even more disastrous, with Husain Ali leading an army to the Deccan and taking the Emperor with him. Nizam had previously defeated Alam Ali, who was backed by a force of 15 to 16,000 Marathas led by Balaji Vishwanath. 

 

•    After that, Nizam moved north and defeated Dilawar Ali Khan. Husain Ali was assassinated before he could confront Nizam-ul-Mulk in a plot hatched by Haidar Quli Khan, the Mir Atish, with the help of M. Amin Khan and others. Abdullah Khan's attempts to raise a new puppet and assemble a new army were in vain. In November 1720, he was defeated near Delhi by M. Amin Khan and Emperor Muhammad Shah.

 

•    The Saiyids' "new" wizarat, which lasted less than two years, came to an end with this. The Saiyids' effort to make the wizarat the centre of affairs and return to the type of liberal, inclusive state associated with Akbar was a significant step forward. 

 

•    It failed partly because of the Barahas' narrow social base, but more importantly because of deep divisions among the nobility, and the strong desire of the old nobles, the Mughals, who saw themselves as the upholders of the dynasty and empire, not to allow power to pass to the despised Hindustanis. 

 

•    The zamindars' turbulence and a growing shortage of productive jagirs exacerbated party strife. The Saiyids also made a number of political errors, such as internal strife, which hastened their demise.